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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
March lS, 19S3 Conference
List 3, Sheet 3
No. S2-1253

~~

v.

Cert to CAS (en bane) (Lay,
Heaney, Bright, Ross, J. Gibson; McMillian, Arnold, diss.)

BARTLETT (Indian convict)

Federal/Civil (Habeas)

SOLEM (warden) , et al.

Timely

SUMMARY: The State of South Dakota contends that the CAS
erred in holding that the state lacked criminal jurisdiction over
a

cr~comm!!ted

by an

I~n

within a,portion of the Cheyenne

River Reservation that was opened to settlement by non-Indians in
190S.
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Resp, an enrolled member of the
I

l

Cheyenne River Sioux

a plea of guilty in state

court to a charge of attempte , rape.

~-~~~. ~-~.

--C\ ~ 0.~. ~ ~
f:n--4t.

~

-\,

~

The crime occurred within

r~~~~~

~ K®~. d~~~. f\UO~
~ eM ~ 'f~ ~ ~

the original confines of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation,
on unallotted land in a portion of the reservation that was
opened to settlement by non-Indians by the federal Act of May 29,
190S.

Resp sought post-conviction relief in the state trial

court.

It is not clear whether resp sought a certificate of

probable cause to appeal to the S.D. s.ct., but the State has
conceded that resp exhausted state remedies.
Thereafter, resp filed a petn for habeas relief in federal
court (D. S.D., Porter), claiming that crimes committed in "Indian country," as defined in lS u.s.c. §1151, result in exclusive
tribal or federal jurisdiction, and that the state therefore
lacked criminal jurisdiction.

The state contended that the 190S

Act "diminished" the Reservation, thereby divesting the tribe and
federal government of jurisdiction over unallotted lands within
the Reservation.
The DC acknowledged that the issue has resulted in conflicting decisions from the federal and the state courts.

The CAS has

consistently held that the area in question is "Indian country,"
see u.s. ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 47S F.2d 6S4 (CAS 1973):
U.S. v. Dupris, 612 F.2d 319 (CAS 1979), vacated and remanded for
consideration of mootness, 446 u.s. 9SO (19SO)
missed as moot).

(subsequently dis-

The South Dakota s.ct., on the other hand, has

consistently held that the Reservation was diminished by the 190S
Act, and is not "Indian country," Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d
117 (S.D. 1977): South Dakota v. Janis, 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D.
March 10, 19S2).

Although the CAS decision in Dupris was vacated

by this Court, this Court declined to rule on the merits of the

underlying issue.

The DC therefore regarded itself as bound by

the CAS approach, and granted the writ of habeas corpus.
The CAS affirmed, en bane, "for the reasons set forth in
United States v. Dupris, supra: United States v. Long Elk, 565
F.2d 1032 {CAS 1977): and United States ex rel. Condon v.
Erickson, [supra]."

Two dissenters continued to believe that

this Court's decision in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430

u.s.

5S4 {1977), required the conclusion that the area in question was
not "Indian country."
CONTENTIONS: PETR--The decisions of the South Dakota S.Ct.
and the CAS are in direct conflict on this issue, necessitating
review.

The conflict is of great importance to the general pub-

lic and law enforcement personnel, since certainty is needed over
whether a given area lies within the jurisdiction of the state
courts or the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

Although this

Court has denied petitions in several other diminishment cases,
none involved a direct conflict between the federal and state
courts.

Furthermore, the CAS decision below conflicted with this

Court's decisions in Rosebud Sioux Tribe, supra, and DeCoteau v.
District County Court, 420 U S. 425 {1975).

The CAS placed con-

siderable reliance on its decision in Erickson, supra, but that
decision preceded this Court's decisions in Rosebud Sioux Tribe
and DeCoteau.

The South Dakota S.Ct., in contrast, properly ana-

lyzed and applied those cases.
AMICUS DEWEY, ZIEBACH, AND CORSON COUNTIES, SOUTH DAKOTA, ET
AL.--An amicus brief submitted on behalf of nine counties from
I

(

five states in the area supports petr.

Each of the counties con-

tains lands similar to those at issue here.

The counties argue

that, despite the principles announced by this Court in Rosebud
Sioux Tribe and DeCoteau, no consistent application of those
principles has emerged.

The CAS misapplied those decisions, and

the judgment below should be reversed.
RESP--Resp acknowledges the existence of a conflict, but
argues that resolution of the conflict is not so important as to
warrant review.

Almost all jurisdictional disputes have arisen

from criminal felony prosecutions.

Because of federal supremacy

and the availability of habeas corpus under 2S

u.s.c.

§2254, the

CAS's construction of the 190S Act provides a practical governing
rule.

In recent years, the

u.s.

Attorney has followed the CAS

rule and asserted federal jurisdiction over major crimes by Indians in the area.

In fact, therefore, the CAS standard provides

sufficient certainty over jurisdiction in the area.
Moreover, the CAS decision is consistent with Rosebud Sioux
Tribe, supra, and other decisions of this Court.

Although Rose-

bud held that a grant of other lands to the State of South Dakota
for the use of common schools evinced an intent to disestablish
those area, there are three significant differences between the
two cases.

In Rosebud, this Court noted that neither Congress

nor the Department of Indian Affairs had sought to exercise its
authority over the area in question, and that the area was over
90% non-Indian.

In contrast, the Reeservation in this case has

an Indian majority and contains the Indian capital and the BIA
headquarters for the reservation.
~

Second, the Rosebud Indians

had agreed to cede to the United States all their claim, right,

title and interest in part of the reservation.
exists here.

No such agreement

Finally, in Rosebud this Court emphasized a Presi-

dential Proclamation opening the reservation to settlement and
stating that the Indian tribe had ceded "forever and absolutely,
without any reservation whatsoever, ••• all their claim, title,
and interest of every kind and character."

In contrast, the

proclamation in the present case merely opened to settlement "all
the nonmineral, unallotted, unreserved lands within the ••. Reservation."

The CAB properly recognized that these and other dif-

ferences require a different result here than in Rosebud.
DISCUSSION: This case merely involves the application of
standards set forth in Rosebud Sioux Tribe, supra.

Unfortunate-

ly, the South Dakota s.ct. and the CAB have reached opposite results in applying those standards to this Reservation, and neither court seems inclined to give in.

There does not appear to

be any clearly correct answer; the legal question essentially
turns on which way one chooses to interpret a massive amount of
ambiguous historical evidence relevant to congressional intent.
As a practical matter, the CAB standards are likely to dominate
(if only because the CAB will grant writs of habeas corpus from
any state criminal convictions), but certainty is needed on
whether state or federal jurisdiction applies in this area.

I

therefore see no way around a grant in this case, although it may
be worthwhile to call for the views of the Solicitor General to
see whether he suggests any good way of avoiding plenary review.
r

l

There are a response and an amicus brief.
March 7, 19B3
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 82-1253
(Argument Date December 7, 1983)
Cammie R. Robinson

Solem v. Bartlett

December 5, 1983

Question Presented

Whether the Act of May 29, 1908 fl908 Act] terminated
the reservation status of those portions of the Cheyenne River
Indian Reservation opened to purchase and settlement by nonindians, thereby giving South Dakota criminal jurisdiction over
offenses involving Indians occuring on those opened portions.
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I. BACKGROUND

There are three types of land relevan

here:

~

tribe

[Reservation];

~

~

owned land within the Cheyenne River Indian Res

and,

L.

(2) non-indian owned land within

(3) land beyond the boundaries of the

first two types of land constitute "Indian Country" within tH

u.s.c.

meaning of 18

§1151. 1

Generally, only federal and

courts have criminal jurisdiction over offenses involving Indian
affairs in "Indian Country."2

The State has conceded that if the

act at issue here occurred in "Indian Country" it does not have
jurisidiction.

.....---------.

-------

The act indisputedly occurred

-

land that was within the original boundaries of the
but that was opened to settlement by the 1908 Act.

2)~

The State

claims that the 1908 Act terminated the reservation status of

al~

land opened by that Act that was subsequently sold to nonindians.

Respondents argue that the 1908 Act merely opened the ~~

land to settlement without diminishing the Reservation
boundaries.

The history necessary to resolve this dispute is set

out most clearly in the SG's Brief at 7-21.

I will merely

summarize the major points.
At the time of the 1908 Act, Congress was taking steps

1 The text of §1151 is set out in Appendix c of the Cert.
Petition at A-13.
It is important only for the fact that it
defines both indian owned and non-indian owned land within a
reservation as "Indian Country."
2 The exceptions to this rule are not relevant here.

toward the eventual abolishment of the reservation system and the
assimilation of the Indian.
two different ways.

This goal was being approached in

First, the "cession" approach effected a

present and total surrender of all tribal interest in the ceded
land in return for an unconditional commitment by the United
States to an agreed payment.

Under this approach, the

reservation status of the ceded lands terminated as soon as the
agreement was perfected.

Second, the "land sale" approach opened

up unallotted reservation lands to sale to and settlement by nonindians under the provisions of the homestead and township laws.
Under this approach, the Government acted as a sales agent,
promising to credit the proceeds of the land in trust to the
benefit of the tribe.

Although it was anticipated that the

unallotted lands would be sold, the Indian assimilated, and the
reservation status of all lands terminated, Acts that merely
opened land up to settlement did not express the same intent
immediately to terminate the reservation status to the opened
land as did the cession agreements.
In the 1930's Congress changed its Indian policy and, in
~

the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, renewed its commitment to
preservation of the reservation system.

It did so partly by

~------------~-------------------~
returning
to tribal ownership all the unsold lands that had been

opened up in the early 1900's.

This policy has persisted, and to

give it effect, this Court has developed certain legal standards
to resolve the question whether any given act of Congress
immediately diminished reservation boundaries or merely opened
land to non-indian settlement without immediately terminating the

5~-u..o--r
reservation status of such land. 3

See Rosebud

Sio~-~

Kniep, 430 u.s. 584 (1977}; DeCoteau v. District County Court,
4 2 0 U • S • 4 2 5 ( 19 7 5} ; Matt z v • Arnett , 412 U. S . 4 81 (19 7 3} ;
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 u.s. 351 (1962).
standards are not disputed here.
CA8

appli~d

t~e~ corre?~ Y

The

These legal

~2! ques ~ is~ ther

~~

when it held that the 1908 Act did not

diminish the reservation boundaries established in 1889.

-

I read

the applicable legal standards as follows:
(1} Congressional intent controls. See Rosebud,
430 u.s. at 586; DeCoteau, 420 u.s. at 444.
(2) In determining intent, this Court will read
doubtful or ambiguous expressions in favor of the
Indian and against termination of reservation status.
See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586; Mattz, 412 u.s. at 505
("A congressional determination to terminate [an Indian
reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act
or be clear from the surrounding circumstances.").
(3) "The mere fact that a reservation has been
opened to settlement does not necessarily mean that the II~
opened area has lost its reservation status." Rosebud,
~,,
430 u.s. at 505. See also DeCoteau, 420 u.s. at 447
(An Act "could be considered a termination provision
~~
only if continued reservation status were inconsistent
with ••• [the] opening of lands to settlement.").
w;~
Remaining true to these legal standards often requires ~
different results depending on the particular Act involved.
Compare Rosebud, 430 u.s. 584 (Acts of 1904, 1907, and 1910
showed clear intent of Congress to diminish boundaries of Rosebud

3 sale of unallotted reservation land to non-indians does not
automatically terminate its reservation status. Only an act of
Congress can do that.
See United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S.
278, 285 ( 1909) (" [W) hen Congress has once established a
reservation, all tracts included within it remain a part of the
reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.").

Reservation and to terminate reservation status of opened land)
DeCoteau, 420

u.s.

~

425 (agreement with the Sisseton and Wahpeton

Indians showed clear intent to terminate reservation status of
all unallotted lands of the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation),
with Mattz, 412

u.s.

481 (Act opening unallotted reservation

lands to settlement did not show clear intent to terminate
reservation status of such

--

lands)~

Seymour, 368

u.s.

351 (same).

The Court granted cert. in this case to resolve the

~ /C~f ~ between CA8 and the South Dakota Supreme Court over the
~

interpretation of the 1908 Act.

~

~ft~
~

Since its decision in United
'

States v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 (CA8 1973), CA8 consistently has
held that the 1908 Act did not diminish the original boundaries

~ of

the Cheyenne River Reservation.

See United States v. Dupris,

612 F.2d 319 (CA8), vacated as moot, 446

u.s.

980 (1979)

States v. Long Elk, 565 F.2d 1032 (CAS 1977) • 4

~

United

State courts, on

the other hand, consistently have held that the 1908 Act
terminated the reservation status of all opened lands sold to
'
I ~ bf1 ...
non-indians.
See South Dakota v. Janis, 317 N.W. 2d 133 ~ ~o~, ~

~
j.

Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W. 2d 117 (S.D. 1977).

II. DISCUSSION

The State argues that the 1908 Act at issue here is more

4 Although Erickson was decided before this Court's decisions in
Rosebud and DeCoteau, CA8 re-examined the issue in Dupris and
found its prior decision fully consistent with the intervening
Supreme Court decisions.

.,>,

similar to the Acts construed in Rosebud and DeCoteau than to
those construed in Mattz and Seymour and that Congress clearly
intended immediately to terminate the reservation status of the
lands thereby opened to settlement.

I disagree.

Applying the relevant legal standards to the acts
opening the Rosebud Reservation to settlement, this Court found
on the face of the 1904 Act a clear congressional intent
immediately to diminish reservation boundaries. 5

The crucial

language of that Act provided in relevant part:
The said Indians belonging on the Rosebud
Reservation, South Dakota, for the consideration
hereinafter named, do hereby cede, surrender, grant,
and convey to the United States all their claim, right,
title, and interest in and to all that part of the
Rosebud Indian Reservation now remaining unallotted,
situtated within the boundaries of Gregory County.
Rosebud, 430 u.s. at 597 (emphasis added).
The Court held that this language was "'precisely
suited' to disestablishment," Rosebud, 430

u.s.

at 589 n.5, 592,

and that it made clear that Congress had enacted all three Acts

5 The opening of the Rosebud Reservation was accomplished by
three acts.
In 1901, Inspector James McLaughlin was sent to
negotiate a cession agreement with the Indians occupying the
Rosebud Reservation. He explained to them that the agreement
would "leave your reservation "a compact, and almost square
tract, and would leave your reservation about the size and area
of the Pine Ridge Reservation." Rosebud, 430 u.s. at 592. Three
fourths of the male Indian adults signed this agreement.
Congress failed to ratify it because it provided for an outright
payment of $1,040,000 to the Indians.
In 1904 an agreement was
signed by a majority of the male Indian adults that was identical
to the 1901 agreement except for the terms of payment.
Additional lands were opened to settlement by the acts of 1907
and 1910 and this Court found that the cession intent remained
the same in those acts as it had in 1901 and 1904. See Rosebud,
430 u.s. at 606, 609.

with the "unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment," id.
at 592.

Thus, the Court held that the Acts were intended to

diminish reservation boundaries "pro tanto" rather than at some
point in the future.

See Rosebud, 430

u.s.

at 588.

legislative history supports this conclusion.

The

See H.R. Rep. No.

443, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1904) quoted in Rosebud, 430

u.s.

at 595 n.l7. 6
The language of the 1908 Act is distinguishable and
suggests that the Act was merely a "E
to that described in Mattz.

d s0

agreement similar

The terms of the 1908 Act proclaim

only that the unallotted portions of the reservation will be
opened to entry and settlement by, and sale to, non-indians.

The

operative language provides in relevant part:
That the Secretary of the Interior •.. is
authorized a~directed ••• to sell and di~ose of all
that portion of the Cheyenne River ••. reservation[]
••• lying [between certain designated boundaries] .•••
Section 1 of 1908 Act at A-3.
The other terms of the Act merely describe how the land is to be
surveyed, divided, and sold (Sec. 2); how the price is to be
determined (Sec. 3); the manner in which payment is to be made

6 The decision in DeCoteau that reservation boundaries had been
diminished was based on identical language, see 420 U.S. at 445,
and similar legislative history, id. at 433-35. The language and
legislative history made clear th~Congress and the Indians were
fully aware of and intended immediately to terminate the
reservation status of the unallotted lands opened to settlement.
The Court, however, was careful to emphasize that its decision
was fully consistent with the legal principles discussed above.
See 420 u.s. at 447 ("We adhere without qualification to both the
holdings and the reasoning of those decisions [in Mattz and
Seymour]. But the gross differences between the facts of those
cases and the facts here cannot be ignored.").

,.

,.

(Sec. 4); and the manner in which such payment is to be credited
to the Indians (Sees. 5 & 6).

The Act seems merely to establish

a land sale with the Government acting as real estate agent.
Although it would be fair to assume that Congress intended that
the reservation eventually would be abolished and the Indians
fully assimilated, I agree with Respondent and the SG that on its
face the 1908 Act does not express the clear intent immediately
to diminish reservation boundaries that this Court has required
in all of its prior cases.

l'fl>l{

In both the Rosebud Acts and the 1908 Act, the language
of the first section, discussed above, announces the general
purpose of the legislation and provides the clearest indication
whether Congress intended the particular Act to diminish
reservation boundaries or merely to sell land.

""

Without the

}\
. language that was so crucial in Rosebud, the
unequivocal cess1on

similarities between the Acts at issue in that case and the Act
at issue here are insignificant.

Although some of the similar

provisions are mentioned in Rosebud as supporting the intent to
diminish boundaries, they support that intent only when read in
context.

The

~ebud

Court made clear that the determinative

factor was the unequivocal cession language in the first

See 430

u.s.

at 608-09.

t~~

Because the

State has not established that the first section of the 1908 Act
clearly evidenced an intent to diminish reservation boundaries,
its reliance on the similarities between the Rosebud Acts and the

1908 Act is misplaced.

tt(tJ '!

sect ~

and that all subsequent provisions must be read in light of
purpose announced therein.

/

Respondent has explained convincingly how

~~&v...tt:ft9T:f~Oo

,,J

~k~~b--~~
each one of the similar

provisio~nsistent

preservation of original reservation boundaries.

with

~e

See Resp Brief

at 22 (Liquor provision) ; at 27 (School lands provision) .
Interpreting congressional intent is particularly tricky
in this area.

All of the Acts that opened reservation land

settlement at this time were enacted with an eye toward the
eventual abolishment of the reservation system.

The

distinction between the various Acts is whether they intended to
terminate the reservation status of the opened lands immediately
or merely to lay the groundwork for future termination.

This is

a distinction that Congress probably was not clearly aware of at
the time.

It is important today because of the renewed

commitment to preservation of the reservation system and of the
Indian's cultural identity.

Besides looking at the statutory

language, the distinction is best resolved by looking at the
historical context of the Act - both at the time of its enactment
and subsequently.
The original boundaries of the Reservation established
in 1889 encompassed 2.8 million acres.

The 1908 Act opened 1.6

million acres of this land to settlement.

At that time, 400,000

----------------------------------

acres in the opened area had been allotted as Indian lands and an
additional 133,000 acres were allotted before the 1909
Proclamation.

This left some 1 million acres open to

homesteaders.

See SG's Brief at 26-27 n.31.

Although the SG is

unable to give the actual acreage, he informs the Court that
"most of the remaining unallotted land was unsold."

Today,

-

"almost half the opened area remains in Indian ownership, all

----------- ---------

it, with minor exceptions, in trust or restricted status." Id.
Despite the attempts of 1908, the Indian remained the prominent
resident of the Cheyenne River Reservation.

In light of these

statistics, this Court should be slow to infer an intent to
diminish reservation boundaries from less than compelling
evidence.
Since the 1908 Act, both the Secretary and the Tribe
have acted as if the original reservation boundaries have
remained in tact.

After passage of the Indian Reorganization Act

of 1934, the Secretary approved the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's
Constitution, which provided in relevant part:
The jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River Reservation
Sioux Tribe of Indians shall extend to the territory
within the original confines of the diminished
reservation boundaries, which are described by the Act
of March 2, 1889. Resp's Brief at 37.
At the same time the tribe reorganized its court system, and the
Secretary approved its Code of Offenses, which provided in
relevant part:
The [Tribe] ••• shall have jurisdiction over all
offenses when committed by any member of the [Tribe] on
the reservation and any person consenting to the
jurisdiction as hereinafter provided ••••
The Cheyenne River Reservation shall be taken to
include all territory within the original reservation
boundaries •••• Resp's Brief at 47.
The 1930's did not represent any change in the jurisdiction of
the Tribe or the perceptions of the Secretary: the tribal court
and tribal police had exercised jurisdiction over the original
reservation with the Secretary's approval since at least 1911.
See Resp's Brief at 46.

In light of this consistent history of

tribal jurisdiction, there has been no reported case in which an

Indian was prosecuted by the state prior to 1963. 7

There was

good reason for the Indian to be wary of State criminal
jurisdiction in 1908.

At that time, Indians were very much

discriminated against and could not serve on the juries that
would try them of any state criminal charge.

In light of the

strong Indian interest in avoiding State criminal jurisidiction
in 1908 and the continued assertion of jurisdiction by the tribal
court since that time, this Court should not be quick to infer
that the 1908 Act terminated the reservation status of the o~

~h-~IN*w

lands.

~ ~»£:~1

Finally, Eagle Butte is a town within the area opened~~-the 1908 Act.

It is also the capital of the Tribe and the he~~~

of the office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

The Bureau was

moved there in 1950 on the ground that it made more sense to have
the office "at some point near the center of the reservation."
See Resp's Brief at 35-36.

Absent an unequivocal intent to the

7 The Stqt~'s rel~nce on United States v. LaPlant, 200 F. 92
(D.S.D. ~ll), is ~isleading.
In that case a non-indian was
indicted for homicide of a non-indian victim on alienated lands
within the orginal boundaries of the Reservation. The DC
dismissed the indictment for lack of federal jurisdiction on the
ground that the State acquired jurisdiction whenever the Indian
title to the land was extinguished. That case involved nonindians, but in any event it applied the wrong legal standard to
determine the existence of federal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
does not depend on title but on whether the land is within the
reservation. See United States v. Thomas, 151 u.s. 577 (1894)
(sustaining federal jurisdiction over homicide by Indian
occurring on land within a reservation to which Indian title had
been extinguished). The "title approach" to jurisdiction taken
by the LePlant court has been repudiated by the present
definition of "Indian Country," which includes all land within an
Indian reservation whether or not held under Indian title.

page 12
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contrary, I agree with the SG that it does not make much sense

-

"to treat as no longer part of t he Reservation an area which
includes the tribal capital, the Indian Agency and the major
Indian town, within which some two-thirds of [the] tribal members
reside (outnumbering non-Indians there), and where almost half
the acreage is Indian owned."

SG's Brief at 27.

III. CONCLUSION

The legal principles are clear: this Court will not
infer a congressional intent to terminate the reservation status
of opened lands absent

clear evidence in the language of the Act

and the relevant legislative history.

CA8 applied the relevant

principles to the 1908 Act and found that Congress had not
intended to diminish reservation boundaries when it opened the
surplus land of the Cheyenne River Reservation to sale and
settlement.

After reviewing the language of the Act, and

comparing it with the language of the Acts that opened the
Rosebud and Lake Traverse Reservations, and after reviewing the
relevant history cited in the briefs, I believe that the CAS's
determination was correct and that this Court should affirm.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
RE:

Herman S. Solem, Warden, and Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General
of South Dakota v. John Bartlett, No. 82-1253
(Case was argued December 7, 1983)

DATE:

December 8, 1983

Since this case is to be discussed at your Conference tomorrow,
before the Attorney General of South Dakota can submit a motion
for leave to file a supplemental brief, he has requested that I
circulate the attached letter (not referred to at oral argument)
calling attention to a significant typographical error in his
brief at page A-28.
The same error is repeated in the brief of the respondent
at page 21.

Respectfully,

Alexander L. Stevas

J. ·R:EC:EIVED

DEC-71983
TOBIN

LAW 0 F' F' ICES, P. C.
SUITE 1113

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT. U.S.

1875 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N . W .

*

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20009

TOM D . TOBIN*

(202) 467-5712

DAVID ALBERT MUSTONE

SOUTH DAKOTA OFFICES
422 MAIN STREET

WINNER, SOUTH DAKOTA 57580

.JOSEPH E . ELLINGSON*
WILLIAM W . SHAKELY
ALVIN R . PAH LK E*

December 7, 1983
The Honorable Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
United States
1 First Street, Northeast
Washington, D.C.
20543
Re:

Herman Solem, et al. v. John Bartlett,
No. 82-1253

Dear Hr. Stevas:
The purpose of this letter is to bring to the
Court's attention a serious typographical error appearing in
the Appendix to the Brief of the Petitioners filed in the
above-captioned case.
This error appears in the reproduction
of an important portion of the legislative history of the
statute in question, and has been repeated in the Brief of the
Respondent.
The error is as follows: At page A-28 of the
Appendix, lines 16 and 17, the phrase "reservations is
diminished" should read "reservations as diminished". See
H.R. Rep. 1539, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3(1908).
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,

~'))~rob,~
Tom D. Tobin
Counsel for the Amici
Counties of Dewey, et al.
cc:

counsel of record
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 6, 1984

Re:

82-1253 - Solem v. Bartlett

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

February a' I 1984

82-1253 Solem v.

Bartl~tt

Thurgood:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

Marshal
·lfp/ss

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

Februa

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 82-1253 - Solem v. Bartlett
Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

I.
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8' 1984

.iu.prttnt <ijqlttf qf t!rt ~~b .Staftg
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CHAMBERS OF"

..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REf:iNQUIST

February 8, 1984
Re:

No. 82-1253

Solem v. Bartlett

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.

Sincerely

Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 8, 1984

Re:

No. 82-1253

Solem v. Bartlett

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMB1!: .. 8 0,.

THE CHIEI'" JUSTICE

February 13, 1984

Re:

No. 82-1253 - Solem, Warden v. Bartlett, John

Dear Thurgood:
I join.
Regards,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

February 13, 1984

Re:

82-1253 - Solem v. Bartlett

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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February 13, 1984

No. 82-1253
Solem v. Bartlett

Dear Thurgood,
I agree.
Sincerely,
I
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Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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Joined by BRW 2/13/84
Joined by CJ 2/14/84

